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A Theory of the Laws of War
Eric A. Posner1

Abstract. The laws of war govern the weapons and tactics that belligerents may use
against each other. This paper uses a model of conflict to explain and evaluate the
laws of war. In the model a nation’s propensity to engage in conflict is a positive
function of the effectiveness of military technology, and a negative function of the
destructiveness of technology. Accordingly, in theory nations would want to agree
to laws of war that permit destructive weapons and tactics but limit their
effectiveness. However, nations with different endowments and resources will
enjoy differential advantages, and this makes agreement on specific laws of war
very difficult. The paper discusses empirical implications of the argument, and
discusses whether the Hague Conventions are consistent with the model.

The ancient Greeks fought many wars among themselves but also observed rules
of battle. These rules prohibited summary execution of prisoners, attack on
noncombatants, the pursuit of defeated opponents beyond a limited duration. and many
other forms of warfare that are condemned to the present day.2 Josiah Ober argues that
the Greek rules were intended to limit the violence of war, and he, like many other
historians, take comfort in what seems like a natural human tendency to limit the brutality
of war. A war in which prisoners are spared is surely more humane than a war in which
they are executed. But another interpretation is possible. These “rules” could be
descriptions of behavioral regularities rather than constraints on self-interested behavior.
Prisoners are not usually executed but only because they have value as hostages and are
often ransomed. Armies often spare noncombatants because they pose no immediate
threat, they can provide supplies, information, and other services, and armies do not wish
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to give other civilians a reason for resistance. And any army that pursues a defeated
opponent risks outrunning its supply lines and falling into disorder. Patterns of behavior
that seem humane are not necessarily signs of humanity. The view shared by Ober and
others mistakenly assumes that the military objective is always to slaughter as many
people as possible, when it is more often to acquire territory and secure other resources,
activities that often are best accomplished by treating civilians and even enemy soldiers
with restraint.
The optimistic view about the laws of war is shared by many scholars in the
international law community. Although their interpretation of events in past wars is, like
Ober’s, often superficial—the common claim that international law prevented most
belligerents from using poison gas against combatants during World War II makes an
unnecessary puzzle of nations’ willingness to violate many other laws during that war—
the pessimistic view that the laws of war have no effect is also too strong. It has trouble
explaining why states talk as though they recognized laws of war, and in the last century
made repeated efforts to codify them and expand them in treaties and conventions. The
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were the first significant official effort to
spell out the rules of war. These rules included a general prohibition on weapons that
cause “unnecessary suffering,” as well as several more specific restrictions on the use of
weapons and tactics. Subsequent conventions have dealt with biological and
antipersonnel weapons, the treatment of prisoners of war, and the treatment of civilians at
time of war.3 And even though the laws of war were widely disregarded during World
War I and World War II, they have been the subject of extensive diplomatic negotiation
since 1945.
The optimistic and pessimistic views, as fleshed out in the literature, differ in their
assumptions about the motivations of states and their interpretations of evidence. The
pessimists assume that states act in their interest, and their interest is usually that of
security and power. The optimists assume that while states act in their interest, they also
internalize the humanitarian norms reflected by international law, and treat them as
3
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partial constraints on behavior. In work with Jack Goldsmith, I have argued that
international law is equilibrium behavior in which self-interested states are constrained
only by their expectations about the strategies chosen by other self-interested states.4 We
agree with the optimists that states can in theory obtain gains through coordination and
cooperation, but we agree with the pessimists that states do not regard international law
as an external binding force, and we also tend to agree with the pessimists that the
evidence suggests that true cooperation is relatively rare.
In this paper I also argue that the laws of war can, in theory, be explained as selfenforcing strategies adopted by self-interested states, though again I find the pessimistic
interpretation of the evidence more compelling than the optimistic interpretation.5 To say
that the laws could produce joint gains is not to say that they do. My focus is not on
whether the rules constrain—it is sufficient to point out that states during interwar
periods either think or hope or pretend that the laws can constrain—but on the content of
the rules.6 The question is, Why would states think it in their interest to consent to laws of
war that confine their choices among weapons and tactics? I will argue that the
conventional wisdom—that the laws of war reflect humanitarian considerations—is
unhelpful, and that the laws of war, like arms limitations agreements, are best understood
as devices for limiting states’ investment in military conflict. But I will also point out a
deep puzzle about these laws.
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I.

The Laws of War: An Overview

The laws of war can be divided into general principles and specific prohibitions.7
The necessity principle holds that the amount of suffering caused by a weapon (in the
form of death, serious injuries, and so forth) should not be more than necessary to
achieve a legitimate military aim. The discrimination principle, and the related
proportionality principle, hold that civilians should not be targeted, and collateral damage
to them and their property should be limited.8
The principles are most easily understood in their application to specific
prohibitions. The necessity principle is illustrated by the distinction between dumdum
bullets, which are proscribed, and explosive shells, which are permitted. Both cause
severe wounds, compared to those caused by ordinary bullets, but the explosive shells
also disable or kill more soldiers. For a given level of suffering, the explosive shell
obtains a larger military objective. To be sure, one might quarrel with both claims, and
argue that dumdum bullets are more effective than explosives and ordinary bullets when
the military objective is to stop enemy soldiers without destroying nearby structures or
civilians, but the basic idea is clear.
The proportionality principle would likely forbid area bombing of cities during
World War II, which was intended to kill and demoralize civilians. The recent American
strategy of bombing targets from high altitudes so that pilots are invulnerable to antiaircraft fire provides a more controversial example. It has been argued that the strategy
produces too many civilian deaths for a given military objective, and that the
proportionality principle requires American pilots to risk their lives and fly at lower
altitudes in order to reduce the harm to civilians.9
7
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Also interesting, but not squarely following from the principles, is a rule against
perfidy, which forbids soldiers to wear the uniforms of enemies, call a truce in order to
lure the enemy into the open where they will be attacked, disguise a warship as a hospital
ship, and so forth. Deception during war is not prohibited: one can trick the enemy into
thinking that one’s army is at point A rather than point B. The prohibition extends only to
deception that involves the manipulation of international law.
There are many other principles and prohibitions, including a great many
maritime rules of an analogous nature, and more detailed rules contained in the Geneva
Conventions and subsequent international court opinions. But those that have been
mentioned serve to convey the general sense of the laws of war.
II.

The Humanitarian View

The conventional explanation for the laws of war is that they serve humanitarian
values, but it is hard to find a detailed defense of this position. The necessity and
discrimination principles are usually identified with the humanitarian premise, as if they
were logically entailed. Other principles or rules, such as those against perfidy, are said to
reflect “chivalric values.”10 The prohibition of highly expensive weapons, a goal of some
of the parties to the Hague Conferences, appears to be based on the goal of making war
less costly, not necessarily to save lives and property during wars.11 The rules also reflect
“deep-seated taboos” like the taboo against fire, and “self-interest,” such as the desire to
preserve a military advantage (like Britain’s navy) against a new technology
(submarines).12 But this hodgepodge is not satisfactory. There might or might not be a
deep-seated taboo against fire; fire has been an important weapon for hundreds of years.
Chivalric values are offended by all kinds of permitted behavior: not just the use of
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deception that does not involve international law, but the use of artillery and other long
range weapons. There are too many moving parts and ambiguous concepts.
The deeper puzzle about the humanitarian theory is that limiting the
destructiveness of weapons and tactics does not necessarily minimize the loss of life and
destruction of property. The contrary view, which has been asserted time and again, is
that short-term ruthlessness reduces long-term suffering.13 Massive destruction promises
to end a war earlier rather than later, and to deter future wars. Nuclear weapons, it is often
argued, kept the peace during the Cold War.14
The standard rejoinder to these objections (other than denial of its empirical
validity) is that the laws of war accept the existence of war, and have the limited role of
constraining suffering.15 But if the result is more war and more suffering, then the laws
do not serve a humanitarian purpose; they are merely perverse.
III.
A.

A Theory

A Simple Case Involving Equal States

Imagine two states (i = 1,2) that start with equal resources (ri) and then invest
them either in productive capital (ei) or military capital (fi).16 Productive capital produces
goods for domestic consumption; military capital produces appropriative capacity—the
ability to extract a share of the other state’s resources. Each state knows that the other
state will divide its resources between production and predation; there is full information.
13
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The efficiency with which resources are converted into productive or military
capital depends on the productive and military technologies. Keeping things simple, we
will assume a simple productive technology where one unit of production produces one
unit of income. Think of the two states jointly producing an income equal to the sum of
their respective investments in productive capital (y = e1 + e2). This joint income is, in
effect, a common pool from which each state extracts a share through its investment in
military capital. Each unit of investment in military capital increases the investing state’s
share of the joint income, holding constant the other state’s investment. If each state
invests an equal amount, each obtains half of the joint income; if one state invests more
than the other, then the first state’s share is larger than one half. The military technology,
m > 0, is a variable that changes as a result of technological and strategic innovation: the
more efficient the military technology, the larger a share of the joint income will be
obtained by a state that invests one additional unit in military capital, holding constant the
other state’s investment in military capital.17
For each state, the optimal outcome occurs if both invest all their resources in
production and none in predation. They produce the maximum output and divide it
evenly.18 The problem is that each state has an incentive to invest in predation as well. If
state j invests 0 in its military, then state i can obtain all of the joint income by investing a
small amount in its military. Because state j has the same incentive, both states will invest
a positive amount in their militaries. Further, because each state expects the other to
engage in some predation, the first state does not expect to obtain the full marginal dollar
of its investment in productive capital; and this creates an additional incentive to move
resources from production to predation. On the other hand, neither state will invest all of
its resources in military capital, for then at the margin it will obtain relatively little from
the other state while foregoing its own opportunity to produce goods and keep a share of
them.

17
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In equilibrium each state will invest equal, positive amounts in both military and
productive capital. What is more interesting, for our purposes, is that they will invest
more in military capital as the military technology becomes more efficient (holding
constant productive efficiency). The reason is that with greater efficiency, the predatory
returns generated by an additional dollar invested in military capital will be greater than
the share of productive returns generated by an additional dollar invested in productive
capacity. But because both states invest more in predation, they become jointly worse off.
Thus, the prisoner’s dilemma-like logic of the game forces the states to impose greater
joint costs on each other as military technology becomes more efficient.
The states will be better off if they can jointly limit (1) investment in military
capital, or (2) the efficiency of military technology. The first goal is generally reflected in
arms limitation agreements, and is not of concern here. The second goal suggests a
hypothesis for the laws of war: that they are designed to limit the efficiency of military
technology.
This hypothesis sheds light both on the general standards and specific rules. The
necessity principle, by requiring states to use weapons and tactics that do not cause too
much harm given a military objective, forces the state to use less powerful or destructive
weapons. By reducing the options available to commanders, the principle reduces the
capacity of a unit of military investment to inflict harm on the enemy. The same is true
for the discrimination principle, which requires a military force to take losses rather than
inflict too much harm on civilians and civilian property. The discrimination principle thus
increases the cost of achieving a given objective, that is, increasing one’s share of the
joint income.
Rules prohibiting poison gas, the execution of prisoners, the laying of untethered
mines at sea, and many other activities exhibit a similar logic. Poison gas can be cheap
and effective; prisoners are costs when conditions prevent their use as hostages or
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workers;19 untethered mines are cheaper than tethered mines; and so forth. Also
consistent with the hypothesis are repeated but usually unsuccessful efforts to restrict
new, highly effective weapons—the crossbow, submarines, nuclear devices.
The rules against perfidy can also be understood from this perspective. Perfidy—
for example, displaying the white flag but then firing on enemy forces as they
approach—is a highly effective tactic, in the sense that it enables a weaker force to inflict
losses on a stronger force by luring the latter into the open. Of course, once one side uses
this tactic, the other side will not trust it, but we must assume that the first side takes the
costs into account. The rules against perfidy removes an option that is sometimes
effective, thus driving up the cost of military operations.
The laws relating to neutrality are designed to make clear the ways that
belligerents will treat neutrals. Belligerents generally want expansive rights—they want
to be able to stop neutral ships and search for, and seize, materials being shipped to the
enemy; and they want to blockade enemy ports. Although belligerents also fear that if
they treat neutrals too roughly, these states will enter the war on the other side, they will
balance this cost against the benefit. If laws of neutrality are constraining, then they again
take away an effective weapon from the hands of the belligerent. (It is conceivable that
strong neutral rights should be counted as the effective weapon; for example, if enemies
ship spies and saboteurs via neutral vessels. But the history of the laws of war suggest
otherwise: that being able to stop, block, or sink neutral ships was an important freedom
for belligerents.)
The main barrier to empirical verification of the model is the difficulty
distinguishing between an efficient technology and an inefficient technology. There is
much debate, for example, about whether poison gas is efficient or inefficient; and
apparently efficient technologies like laser-guided bombing are not efficient if they are
too costly. Still, the “technology limitation” hypothesis has enough support to be
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considered a legitimate rival to the ill-defined humanitarian view. It implies that laws of
war will be directed foremost at the most efficient weapons (that is, with the highest ratio
of military effectiveness to cost, and thus not necessarily the most expensive weapons). It
also implies that states would ban all weapons if they could; but we will see why they do
not go that far in the next two sections.
B.

Unequal States

Suppose now that state i starts with more resources than state j does. Some of the
basic results of the original analysis continue to hold: each state will invest some amount
in military capital and as a result neither is as well off as it would be if both invested
solely in productive capital. However, with unequal resources there is a twist.
Suppose that the military technology is below some threshold m*. Despite its
greater wealth, state i will invest the same amount in military capital that state j invests,
and thus more in productive technology. The reason is that state j, given its limited
resources, will not produce much income; thus state i gains little from investing in
predation, and instead will invest more in production. State j thus has all the more to gain
from predation—it gets a share of the income disproportionately produced by state i.
State j will gain relative to state i: in the extreme case, they could end up with the same
share of the joint income. Hirshleifer calls this phenomenon the “paradox of power”: a
weaker state can gain at a stronger state’s expense.20
This result does not hold for sufficiently high m and for sufficiently great
inequality, however. Above a certain m*, and with sufficient inequality, state i will be
able to invest much more in military capital than state j can. State j’s resources put a
ceiling on the amount it can invest in military capital; once production is down to 0, state
j can allocate no more resources to the military. But a sufficiently large state i can devote
much more to the military, and thus maintain its advantage against j or do better. An
illustration might be the American defeat by Vietnam and victory over Iraq. In the
20
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comparatively low-technology Vietnam war, Vietnam’s lack of productive opportunities
made its opportunity cost of military investment very low.21 As for Iraq, even if it had put
all its resources into military investment, it would have been unable to resist superior
American technology and training.
The result adds a dimension to the earlier model. There is a long history of using
international law against small predatory states: from the Berber pirates to the current
exporters of terrorism. Efforts to ban the use of chemical and biological weapons, and the
spread of nuclear weapons, reflect this logic, as does (controversially) recent efforts to
ban antipersonnel mines. A small state with powerful weapons can extract tribute,
concessions, and other benefits from a much wealthier state, and wealthier states would
like to respond, even in concert, by creating international law that restricts the weapons
and tactics that favor the small states.22 The rules requiring humane treatment of POWs,
and permitting trickery but not torture to extract information from them, while to all
appearances humane, likely benefits wealthier states that have the resources to hold
POWs in decent conditions, transport them to safe locations, and conduct lengthy
interrogations. But if we can understand why large states would create international law
banning these weapons and tactics, we should not be surprised that they have trouble
enforcing it. Large states that suffer less from small state extortion have little reason to
aid large states that suffer more from it, and indeed refraining from rendering such
assistance will produce relative gains in a security competition.
The model therefore suggests that the small states will not necessarily consent to
the laws of war. When North Vietnam objected to a proposed law against cluster bombs
during the Lucerne Conference of 1974, a delegate explained that “a weapon used by the
imperialist is an imperialist weapon.... In the hands of a liberation fighter, it is a sacred
tool.”23 Small states seek to outlaw only those weapons and tactics that rich states alone
can afford. Rich states will support bans on cheap and effective weapons, and also on
21
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more expensive ones to the extent that they are more concerned about their absolute level
of production than about the relative standing of poorer states. Multilateral consensus will
be difficult to achieve, and peace conferences that begin with high hopes will often
produce vague principles or rules with large loopholes—a recurrent complaint about the
Hague and Geneva conventions.
C.

Destructive Weapons

One can make a useful distinction between effective weapons and destructive
weapons.24 For a given level of military investment an effective weapon increases the
state’s share of joint income more than a less effective weapon. By contrast, holding
constant its effectiveness, a destructive weapon reduces the size of the joint income more
than a less destructive weapon. In the prior sections, we assumed that military capital had
zero destructiveness: the loss of income came indirectly through the investment in
military capital rather than productive capital. With positive destructiveness, a weapon
reduces the size of the joint income independently of its effect on parties’ incentives to
allocate resources between the two types of capital.
The destructiveness of weapons appears to be an important theme of the laws of
war. Illustrations include limitations on destruction to civilians and civilian structures, on
the mistreatment of POWs, on weapons that cause devastating wounds, on mines and
other weapons whose dangerousness persists after the conflict ends, and on weapons that
cause significant environmental harm. The objectionable feature of these practices is, one
might argue, not the efficiency of the technology but the extent to which the weapons
harm productive capital, defined broadly to include the human capital of civilians and of
soldiers after they are demobilized.
One might therefore believe that the laws of wars are designed to limit the
destructiveness of war, and in doing so, to increase production and reduce investment in
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military capital. But the truth is more complex. It is possible that limits on the
destructiveness of weapons make states worse off, not better.
To see why, one must understand that the destructiveness of a weapon has a good
as well as a bad side: states are less likely to go to war against states that have destructive
weapons, even if all states have the same weapons. Assume that each of two states has
the same resources. Imagine that the existing military capacity of a state can be measured
by a variable v, where a high v means that a given investment in military capacity results
in a relatively large reduction in the joint surplus available to both states. If v = 0, as in
our examples prior to this section, then each state will invest a given amount in military
technology. For v > 0, each state will reduce its investment in military technology. The
reason is that while a given amount of military activity will have the same distributional
effects as before, it will also reduce the size of the joint income that will be divided. With
a lower marginal benefit from military investment, states will invest fewer resources in
military capital. In equilibrium, there will continue to be some military investment, but
much less, and the joint income will be higher than it would be if v were equal to 0. If a
state can win a war only by destroying the enemy’s cities and factories—and in the
process will lose its own cities and factories as well—then the fruits of victory are not
particularly attractive, and neither is conflict.
The argument is not as paradoxical as it sounds: many people believe that the
destructiveness of nuclear weapons explains why there was no serious military conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and this was one
reason why the I.C.J. did not declare them illegal.25 In addition, during World War II
commanders frequently used a similar argument to justify the destruction of cities and
civilians through massive aerial bombardment. The more ruthless we are today, the more
likely they will surrender tomorrow rather than a year from now.
But the argument cannot be a full explanation for the laws of war: the laws of war
do not forbid less destructive weapons, as the argument implies that they should.
25
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According to the model, the laws of war should forbid non-destructive weapons, and
should permit destructive weapons. However, the analysis of destructiveness suggests an
important negative conclusion: that states will be reluctant to ban efficient weapons that
are also destructive.
Let us say a few words about destructiveness when states have unequal
endowments. Recall that poor states gain more from highly effective weapons than
wealthy states do, at least up to some threshold of effectiveness. This gives wealthy states
a reason for favoring laws that limit the effectiveness of weapons. One might think that a
similar logic is at work for destructiveness. But there are many offsetting effects. An
increasingly destructive weapon makes conflict less likely, but as we have seen, conflict
can (but does not always) favor poorer states. On the other hand, the destruction itself is a
deadweight cost and can reduce joint income to the point where the poorer state is made
worse off. And of course much depends on the extent of the inequality of resources. So it
is hazardous to judge the impact of destructiveness on enthusiasm for international law
when states have unequal resources.
D.

Summary

States have an interest in agreeing to binding (if possible) laws of war that limit
the effectiveness of military weapons; but the zone of agreement shrinks as one takes
account of (1) the inequality of wealth among states; (2) the value of effective but
destructive weapons for averting war. In the next section, we discuss further reasons why
agreement on the laws of war is difficult.
V.
A.

Complications

Technological and Other Strategic Asymmetries

A significant barrier to agreement on the laws of war is the asymmetry of the
positions of states. We have already discussed asymmetry of resources. Another

14

asymmetry is technological. Russia proposed the Hague Peace Conferences in the hope
of restricting a powerful type of field gun recently developed by Austria-Hungary.
Austria-Hungary naturally opposed Russia’s design and no such law was created.
Another asymmetry is strategic. Britain sought restrictions on submarines because it
feared that they would threaten Britain’s dominant navy. States with weaker navies
opposed Britain’s position.26 Opponents of the recent treaty that bans mines point out that
many signatories have no need for mines; for other states, mines keep the peace between
them and belligerent neighbors. When a facially neutral law of war has distributional
effects because of the asymmetric positions of states, agreement will be difficult unless
there are side payments or compromises. But because of the great heterogeneity among
states—and particularly in their technological capacities and their strategic positions—it
will be very rare for all states to benefit from a significant limitation on weapons or
tactics; and if states care about their relative position, vanishingly rare. Asymmetry of
position is probably the most important factor limiting the laws of war, forcing peace
conference delegates to produce vague standards rather than crisp rules.27
B.

Verifiability

Another significant barrier to agreement is the problem of verifiability. Morrow
discusses an incident during World War II, when the Luftwaffe bombed an American
ship that carried chemical weapons.28 The resulting chemical cloud might have been seen
as a deliberate use of chemical weapons, and a violation of the law of war, justifying
retaliation in kind. If states jointly benefit from the prohibition of one weapon or tactic,
but not from the prohibition of a closely related weapon or tactic, then the viability of a
law against the first depends on whether it can be distinguished from the second.

26

See Legro, supra note __, at 36. France during the Napoleonic Wars also attempted to use
international law to constrain Britain’s dominance at sea; see Hattendorf, supra note __, at 107. There have
been similar conflicts between nations that depend on maritime commerce, and their opponents; see
Howard S. Levie, Mine Warfare at Sea (1992).
27
International criminal courts and international war crimes legislation also fit within the analysis: the
ICCJ is best understood as an effort to increase the United State’s cost of projecting military power. See
Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court (unpublished manuscript, 2002).
28
Morrow, supra note __, at __.
15

C.

Multistate Agreements and Wars

Wars often involve more than two powers. An increase in the number of states is
likely to result in an increase in the amount of military investment, and a decrease in the
amount of productive investment. The logic is the same as that for the Cournot model of
oligopoly: as the number of firms increases, cooperation becomes more difficult, and the
cooperative surplus declines. The laws of war should be either weaker and more limited,
or broken more frequently, as the number of states increases.
The modern laws of war emerged from multilateral conferences, and have many
signatories. Morrow argues that many states agree to laws in advance of war, rather than
a few belligerents agreeing to laws at the start of a war, because in the prewar period a
veil of ignorance facilitates agreement by masking the distributional effects of the laws.29
The problem with this view is that the multilateral treaty must be self-enforcing; and if
earlier agreement is disadvantageous to one state at the start of the war, the state will not
obey the treaty. In addition, states do send each other messages during wars, in which
they abjure first use of a weapon like poison gas but threaten to retaliate in case of use by
the enemy. The simplest explanation for multilateral treaties is that every state, or nearly
every state, faces some of the same basic strategic interactions in any war, and so there
are gains from multilateral negotiations rather than numerous bilateral negotiations. But
one conjectures that these treaties have more influence on subsequent two-state wars than
on multistate free-for-alls, where strategies of reciprocation are less likely to succeed.
D.

Offense and Defense

There is a difference between offensive technology and defensive technology. It is
said that the machine gun was a decisive defensive weapon at the time, and the tank was
a decisive offensive weapon. One might conjecture that the laws of war would be
designed to discourage offensive technology and encourage defensive technology.

29

Morrow, supra note __, at __.
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The problem with this argument, however, is that offensive and defensive
technologies should have similar effects on the depletion of joint income. A high
offensive technology encourages each state to invest more in conflict: one dollar on
offense now yields a higher share holding the other side’s strategy constant. But the same
argument applies to defensive technology. With highly effective defensive technology,
each state will invest more in defense, thus diverting resources from productive uses. The
logic is symmetrical.30
E.

Ineffective Weapons

It is sometimes suggested that laws of war prevent states from using ineffective
weapons, rather than effective weapons.31 The laws against use of poison gas might have
succeeded because poison gas was an ineffective weapon. Humane treatment of POWs
might be a useful strategy for encouraging surrender. These arguments might be true, but
it is hard to understand why states would bother to outlaw practices that have no military
value. A state would unilaterally refrain from those practices and hope that the enemy is
foolish enough to engage in them. There is no law against the bow and arrow; why
should there be a law against poison gas that blows back onto friendly troops? It might be
the case that these weapons have a very small military value, and so states comply with
international law in order to enhance their reputations for being good international
citizens; but if the cost of refraining from use is so small, the reputational gain should be
minimal. The better interpretation is that states ban weapons and tactics that states
believe, or fear, will be highly effective, and indeed that was their attitude about poison
gas prior to World War II.32

30

Grossman’s model distinguishes offense and defense, and what for Hirshman is the “conflict
technology” is for Grossman the advantage of offense over defense. But Grossman’s model does not shed
additional light on the laws of war.
31
Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of International Law: Comments on the Conference, J. Legal.
Stud. (forthcoming 2002); this is also an implicit theme in Best, supra note __; for example, where he
argues that area bombing during World War II was illegal because it was both inhumane and less effective
than precision bombing. Id., p. 303.
32
See Legro, supra note __, at 158-59 (interwar military opinion held that gas had great military
value).
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VI.

Empirical Analysis

The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 collectively produced 23
conventions, declarations, and final acts. Forty-six states signed, ratified, or adhered to
some or all of the seven 1899 documents by 1907. Forty-five states signed, ratified, or
adhered to some or all of the sixteen 1907 documents by 1914. I analyzed these data
statistically, focusing on the 1907 documents because there was greater variation in the
states’ responses.
The dependent variable was the number of documents which a state signed,
ratified, or adhered to, minus the number of reservations. For the 1907 conference, the
dependent variable could range from 0 to 16; in fact, the range was from 7 to 16. The
dependent variable is thus a crude measure of a state’s enthusiasm for the 1907
documents.33 Independent variables are various economic, political, and demographic
variables, as described below.
Let me begin with the humanitarian view. Because no one has provided a theory
of humanitarianism, it is hard to derive a testable hypothesis. But one possibility is that
democracies are more like to support laws of war than non-democracies are. To test this
hypothesis, I use an index from 0 to 10 developed by political scientists, with a higher
number representing more democratic institutions.
The most concrete result of the conflict model is a prediction that states will
support laws of war that limit effectiveness but not laws that limit destructiveness. But
although the distinction is conceptually clear—a neutron bomb is less destructive than
conventional explosives of equal magnitude, but just as effective—I have not found data
that reflect this distinction. So instead I focus on some subsidiary, and more ambiguous,
hypotheses.

33

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Reports to the Hague Conferences of
1899 and 1907, at 175-77, 898-901 (1917).
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First, I hypothesize that militarily weaker states will more strongly support the
laws of war when they involve expensive new technologies, as was the case with the
Hague Conference, which can be traced to the emergence of frightening and expensive
new weapons from the industrial revolution. Second, states that have recently been in
wars will more strongly support laws of war, because they will have better information
about the effectiveness of weapons. Third, economically powerful states will more
strongly support the laws of war because they gain more from production than from
military predation. Variable definitions and sources, and summary statistics are in the
appendix, and the results, under alternative specifications, are in Table 1. (I could not test
all the hypotheses in a single regression because of the low number of observations.
Instead, I ran alternative specifications and here I report only five of them. In other
regressions I obtained similar results albeit not always significant, and the reported
regressions represent the stronger end.)
Table 1
1

2

–.04 (–1.7)

3

4

.11 (1.0)

.11 (1.1)

–.02 (–1.3)

–.03 (–2.5)

0.07 (0.7)
–.01 (–.9)
–.02 (–.02)

.07 (0.08)
–.68 (–2.3)

5

–.36 (–1.7)

–.5 (–2.8)

–.41 (–1.8)

.0002 (1.9)

25

40

40

41

41

0.27

0.14

0.1

0.13

0.14

0.033

0.04

0.05

0.03

0.03

Note: dependent variable is number of 1907 conventions, declarations, etc., to which state
agreed, minus reservations; population is logged; military expenditures is in pounds (not
1000s of pounds); in bold if statistically significant at 0.1 level or below.

The humanitarian hypothesis is not supported by the democracy variable. As for
the conflict hypotheses, the military variable is consistent (but not robustly) with the
weak state hypothesis; the war variable provides no support for the learning hypothesis;
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and the population variable (robustly) contradicts the economic power hypothesis. The
ships variable might reflect economic power, and if reliable, might be a better proxy for
economic power (reliable GDP figures are not available), in which case the third
hypothesis gains some support; but the ships variable will also be biased against
landlocked nations.
I do not want to make much of either the negative or positive results. One can
think of lots of reasons for not trusting the data (including the low number of
observations, the unreliability of historical data, and the high degree of multicollinearity).
But further research would be illuminating, and a natural place to look would be the
Geneva Conventions, and in particular the length of time before a state ratified them, and
the number of reservations.

Conclusion
One cannot say with confidence that the laws of war constrain the behavior of
states, but one can say that states see an advantage in entering treaties and conventions
regarding the laws of war. This might be public relations, as is sometimes argued, but it is
just as likely that states perceive a more concrete benefit if mutual compliance turns out
to be possible and no harm done if mutual compliance does not occur. The benefit,
should mutual compliance occur, is greater production and consumption for civilians than
would occur if military investment were unconstrained. In this way, the laws of war (jus
in bello) are consistent with other laws and agreements about war. Laws of war, and arms
control agreements and limitations on the conditions under which war can be wage (jus
ad bello), work together to reduce the total amount of resources devoted to predatory
activities. The puzzle for the humanitarian theory—that humanitarian laws of war might
increase suffering by encouraging war—is thus avoided.
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Appendix34
A.

Two Equal States.

There are two states (i = 1, 2) with equal resources, r (r = r1 = r2). Each divides ri
among productive effort, ei, and fighting effort, fi. Thus: ri = ei + fi. They produce joint
income of y, and we will assume y = e1 + e2. Each state’s share of the income is a
function of the amount invested in effort: pi = fim / (fim + fjm), where j ≠ i. Thus, each state
obtains income of yi = piy.
Each state maximizes its share of the income given the other state’s strategy of
maximizing its own share. The reaction curves (except for corner solutions) are:
fi / fjm = m(e1 + e2) / (f1m + f2m)
It follows that: f1 = f2 = me1 = me2 = r – me1. It is clear that as m increases, the
share of income devoted to fighting increases, the share devoted to productive effort
declines, and income declines.
Let ri = 100. (Thus joint resources are 200). If m = 1, then each state devotes 50 to
fighting and 50 to production. Income is thus 100, and each state ends up with 50.
Conflict dissipates 100.
Now let m = 2. Then each state devotes twice as much to fighting as to
production. Given initial resources of 100, each states devotes 67 to fighting and 33 to
production. Income is thus 66, and each state ends up with 33. Conflict dissipates 134.
The states would be jointly better off if they could agree to limit m (or f).
Technically, limiting m means preventing either side from improving weapons and tactics
34

Sections A and B are based on simplified versions of the model in Hirshleifer, supra note __; section
C contains a modified version of that model.
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in such a way that would increase its share of the income if the other side did not also
improve weapons and tactics.
B.

Two Unequal States

Now let r1 > r2. Hirshleifer shows that under certain conditions, the poorer state
can obtain a (relative) advantage from conflict with a richer state. Formally, y1 / y2 < r1 /
r2. Here is his numerical example:
Let (r1, r2) = (200, 100), and m = 1. From the reaction curves, (f1, f2) = (75, 75),
(e1, e2) = (125, 25), and (y1, y2) = 75, 75. Thus, the states go from a relationship of
inequality to a relationship of equality.35
However, at a sufficiently high m the original relationship of inequality will be
sustained or made more extreme. Consider, for example, the case where m = 3. If there
were an interior solution, state 2 would need to invest more than 100 in f2; with the
resource ceiling state 2 will invest 100 only. State 1’s best response is too choose f1 =
113. Thus: (e1, e2) = (89, 0), and (y1, y2) = (49, 40). Here, the rich state retains a relative
advantage, although not as high as when it began. But as m increases, the rich state will
obtain an increasingly large portion of the initial income, and eventually will improve its
relative position. Thus, if military technology is relatively low, and resources are not too
unequal, rich states will seek to limit military technology, and poor states will not; if
military technology is relatively high, and resources are sufficiently unequal, poor states
will seek to limit military technology, and rich states will not.
C.

Destructiveness

We can add a variable v, for destructiveness, and alter Hirshleifer’s model in the
following way. For state 1 (and similarly for state 2), let:

35

This is Hirshleifer’s example, p. 53.
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 f1  e1 + e2

y1 = 
v −1
 f1 + f 2  ( f1 + f 2 ) v

The destructiveness variable, v ≥ 1. If v = 1, then the model is the same as Hirshleifer’s
(with m = 1), which assumes no destructiveness. For a higher v, the surplus declines in
proportion to the amount invested in military capital.
Using constrained optimization, the reaction curve for state 1 (and similarly for
state 2) is:
vf1
e + e2
= 1
f1 − v( f1 − f 2 ) f1 + f 2

One can see that when v = 1, Hirshleifer’s reaction curves obtain. It is also clear that total
productive investment (that is, joint income) is increasing in v, that is, with
destructiveness. For the equal resources case, ei = fvi.
D.

Summary Statistics

The dependent variable is the number of conventions, declarations, or acts to
which a state consented, minus the number of reservations. The statistics are divided into
a table for the “enthusiastic states” (dependent variable > 13), and the “less enthusiastic
states.”36

36

Democracy variable from the Polity II dataset: ftp://isere.colorado.edu/pub/datasets/p4/p4vksg.asc.
Wars since 1870 are from Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms 82-99 (1982). The Great
Powers (Italy, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, Japan, and the United States) are taken from
Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System 48 (1983). All other data are from the Correlates of
War Project at the University of Michigan: http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/dataset.html. The baseline was
1900, though not all data were available for that date; if not data within ten years were used.
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yes – res > 13
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

dependent

19

15

0.666667

14

16

democracy (0–10)

19

2.947368

2.676517

0

10

population (1000s)

21

7203.952

11506.23

417

46798

urban population

21

538.5238

931.5033

0

3175

military expenditures (1000s of £’s)

20

2468.1

4502.113

35

16242

war in last 30 yrs (yes=1)

21

0.428571

0.507093

0

1

merchant ships

12

2504.417

4037.851

1

12639

yes – res < 14
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

dependent

26

11.5

1.581139

7

13

democracy (0–10)

25

3.28

3.576777

0

10

population (1000s)

24

38234

88454.73

240

425577

urban population

23

2560.174

4286.775

0

14207

military expenditures (1000s of £’s)

23

14591.22

27494.24

87

119587

war in last 30 yrs (yes=1)

26

0.461539

0.508391

0

1

merchant ships

15

4895.4

7896.372

1

23333
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Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago Law School
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Chicago, IL 60637
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